Trump's logic - analyzed by Prof. Dr. Werner J. Patzelt
Donald Trump is not changing the global order rhetorically, but operationally: through power politics, economic pressure and clearly defined interests. In his analysis "Trump's new world order" for the Club of clear words Werner J. Patzelt reveals the inner logic of this policy - and makes visible the dynamics that arise from it for Europe.
Patzelt is one of the most influential German political scientists. For decades, he has analyzed political systems with analytical acuity, independence and a clear eye for contexts relevant to decision-making. He names where others evade and classifies without moralizing.
This analysis does not remain abstract.
Werner J. Patzelt will speak at the B-Safe26 Summit in Abu Dhabi in person and deepen his assessments in a direct exchange with the participants. The B-Safe26 Summit brings decision-makers and interested parties together with international speakers - focused, substantive and beyond public routines. The event is aimed at those who need to understand the concrete effects of global power politics on markets, the state's ability to act and long-term planning and decision-making security - and to derive their own strategic consequences from this.
// by Werner J. Patzelt
They just talk and do nothing!
This is how many people complain about their politicians. Donald Trump also talks a lot. But you can't seriously claim that he won't change anything. After just one year in office, he has changed the global political situation with his customs policy, his handling of Russia's war against Ukraine and his great power policy towards Iran, Venezuela and Greenland.
At best, non-Americans can look at the domestic political damage caused by his way of governing from the comfortable vantage point of a mere observer. But Trump's foreign policy also affects us Europeans and calls for a review of our usual ways of thinking and attitudes.
In the US presidential interest, Trump is passing on the Ukrainian costs of the war against Russia to the European countries. It will soon become clear that this will multiply their budgetary problems. However, these are already threatening the domestic political stability of these countries, and not just in France. This means that the first pillar on which Europe used to base its global political presence is tottering: the financial and economic power with which global influence can be generated. But the second pillar is also wavering, namely the reliability of an international order based on rules. It was once shaped according to European-Western principles and owed its validity initially to European, and since 1945 essentially to US military power. However, President Trump no longer wants to use it as a "world policeman", but primarily in line with US national interests.
European observers are saying yes. Yes, it is good when dictators like Saddam Hussein or Nicolás Maduro are toppled and brought to justice. But is it really a good thing to conquer an entire country or simply kidnap a head of state? Yes, it is good when governments actively solve problems and don't put their energy into explaining why they can't do what they want to do. But how credible is the talk of a world order bound by rules or even values when US presidents grant themselves an official right to arrest or kill political opponents by military commando action in the service of national interests, to raise tariffs with the intention of blackmail or to demand the cession of countries that belong to another, even allied state? And yes, it is good if there are territorial responsibilities for the preservation of an international peace order. But with whom will Europe maintain its own peace order if the USA is only to be responsible for the Americas, China for the Far East, Russia for the rest of Eurasia - and whoever for the crisis zone between the Arab-Islamic countries and South Africa? Which new alliance systems should then be formed by whom, and at what risk?
In any case, we Europeans are becoming increasingly aware of our own powerlessness. The EU almost humbly accepted the US tariff dictate. Europe's heads of state and government sat in front of the American president's desk with the utmost deference. Like subjects, they continue to await the agreements that Trump and Putin may or may not make over the phone. Like West Germany after the Second World War, Europe feels defenceless without US power. No differently than an entrepreneur in financial distress trembles when his loans fall due, Europe's leaders fear the time when China will control Taiwan's chip production or Trump will give Europe the choice of either self-destructively giving up Greenland or defying the US in a NATO-destroying way. And, of course, the only reason why top European politicians are not calling the US actions in Venezuela a breach of international law in the same way as Russia's actions against Ukraine is because they do not want to fall out with the current US president out of fear of power politics. Meanwhile, it is hoped that the Russian president will one day disappear from the global political stage like Kaiser Wilhelm after Germany's war-related revolution in 1918.
It remains to be seen what will happen with Venezuela. In the simplest case, the relationship with the USA will be like that which once existed between England and those possessions that were ruled by loyal elites. The coming fate of Venezuela will be a lesson to the Colombians and Cubans, especially if it develops to the advantage of both that country and the USA. In any case, the "Donroe Doctrine" will develop into a geopolitical fact and prevent non-European powers from gaining greater influence in Latin America within the BRICS alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. We Europeans may even like that. At the same time, America is leaving it to the EU to deal with Russia in the western part of Eurasia and to the Japanese to stand in the way of China's expansion until its forces are possibly tied down again by domestic political problems. Meanwhile, the USA is exploring economic profit opportunities with India, Arab states and in southern Saharan Africa.
And Europe? Its global standing, which had only been gradually achieved since the late 16th century and was at its peak before the First World War, dwindled militarily with the Second World War and economically half a century later. As a geopolitically important and valued follower of the USA in the East/West conflict, it was possible to indulge in the conviction for decades that Europe's accustomed position at the top of a world order dominated by the "West" would continue. It could possibly have turned out that way. However, the victory achieved together with the USA in the East/West conflict first made Europe's states complacent and then overconfident in terms of security, economic, social and environmental policy. In any case, the goals pursued in reality - not just rhetorically - have moved away from securing scientific excellence, economic competitiveness and cultural identity. Nevertheless, many are now surprised that not only is Europe's ability to defend itself materially and emotionally in tatters, but that it is also dependent on other countries for medicines and computer technology. Many are also only gradually realizing that there is no shortage of young people who have difficulties understanding and behaving as part of European culture.
No wonder that the call to "strengthen Europe" resounds all the louder. This regularly refers to the institutional structure of the EU. It should be given more powers and additional sources of funding should be tapped into. At the same time, however, there is growing resistance to the emergence of a "European government" in Brussels. The United Kingdom has therefore already left the EU, and Eastern European states such as Poland, Slovakia and Hungary are clearly working towards a change of course in terms of integration policy. On top of this, the forthcoming accession negotiations with Ukraine will lead to an even more drastic change in European policy expectations than the accession negotiations with Turkey, which once came to nothing. The far-reaching consequences of the emerging Greenland problem for Europe's defence identity, which is already being challenged by the "Europeanized" Ukraine conflict, cannot be foreseen.
So what next in the attempt to strengthen Europe? It would be advisable not to consider the transformation of the American geopolitical role that has now begun as one that will end with Donald Trump's presidency. Therefore, we should not continue to count on a partnership with the USA from which Europe benefits as a free rider. It should also be borne in mind that the EU is no longer part of the USA's central strategic zone of interest. This changes the role of the North Atlantic as Europe's "backyard". After all, the EU is located like a peninsula in western Eurasia, on which Russia, as a huge, post-colonial landmass, will not disappear despite China's expansion. However, the continued existence of Russia cannot be integrated into the EU's political and cultural framework, nor would it be acceptable for the EU to subordinate itself to Russia's imperial claims. Moreover, there is neither the geographical possibility nor the political will to establish a security system between the EU and Russia that is based on a strategic nuclear deterrence logic such as that which functions between the USA and Russia. European-Russian security relations must therefore be structured differently.
The idea that, together with China, Russia could be brought to heel in the same way that France and Poland tried to do with Germany after the First World War will in practice lead to no better results than back then, namely to mutual mistrust and instability with the risk of war. Therefore, the next step towards a favorable global political situation for the EU would be to define such political goals in the current war with Russia, which is being waged alongside Ukraine, from the pursuit of which a reliable balance of interests between the EU and Russia can emerge. Only this will lead to a peace order that allows three good conditions to be achieved: that the EU can no longer be pushed to the margins by the USA, unlike at present; that Russia is not permanently forced to the side of China; and that the EU can benefit together with Russia from the resources that Eurasia has available for its two European poles of power - especially in a warmer geological age. J.
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13 Responses
The unifying element for Europe, Russia and the USA is Christianity. It has spread from Europe to both the East and the West. Without a return to the Christian view of humanity, Christian values such as "living for others" and a common expectation (eschatology), i.e. a human family with God as its center, we will not be able to resolve the conflicts in the long term. Everyone will have to reconsider and rethink in equal measure and, if necessary, correct their course
In Europe and Russia, Christianity may still (!) have an identity-forming function. The USA, on the other hand, is dominated in the background by a powerful alliance of Freemasons, Zionists and the Axis of Israel, all of whom are anti-Christians. For Freemasons, Jesus is the greatest evil in the world. Evangelicals blindly follow the Zionists, perhaps in the hope of finding themselves in the post-apocalyptic age.
Christianity is currently the most persecuted religion in the world, apart from the bloody internal Islamic conflicts. Unfortunately, the Vatican doesn't have much to do with Christianity. In my eyes, the charismatic Pope Francis was an antichrist, as he was at least open to the Islamization of Europe through the migration of millions of young Muslims. The demographic course has been set, there is no turning back. Even the Vatican knows that. In half a century's time, Islam could ensure that Christianity is at best a marginal religious phenomenon in Germany.
Strategy is more important than power
As with a company, the same applies to geopolitics: strategy is more important than power. Power results from the control of resources. Capital and energy are resources - important, but not decisive, if you can prevent extreme scarcity through clever tactics.
In my opinion, Europe's strategy can only have one goal: Its own independence. And in the short term, that means reducing its dependence on America without increasing its dependence on Russia and China.
Despite all the EU's weaknesses, it has ensured that war between its members is becoming increasingly unlikely. This must be preserved.
However, the entire architecture of the EU is not prepared for external challenges. China, Russia and the USA can torpedo important EU decisions at any time by putting pressure on or bribing individual countries.
The attempt at closer defense policy cooperation between France, the UK and Germany is a good thing. But what will happen if France is soon led by the Rassemblement National and the UK by UKIP?
Domestic policy: Here it becomes clear that there are plenty of domestic problems that stand in the way of a common European geopolitical position. If Merz focuses too much on geopolitics, then the AFD can fuel the growing discontent and then present us with similar problems to France and the UK. There are real reasons for the population's growing dissatisfaction. The turn to populist parties may be irrational, but the dissatisfaction has real causes that need to be addressed, including from a geopolitical perspective.
Foreign policy: How can it be ensured that Europe's geopolitical independence can continue to be strengthened even if individual countries (temporarily) no longer feel committed to such a goal? How can structures be created that can withstand such a stress test?
Schäuble had envisaged an answer to this problem with his "two-speed Europe". The current attempt to forge a "coalition of the willing" for different problems seems to me to be a pragmatic way forward. But there is also no way around a further restriction of the unanimity principle.
Domestic and geopolitical problems can only be solved through innovation. Innovation is more important than capital and energy because it creates capital and can discover and use new sources of energy. And social innovations are probably even more important than technical innovations. And these will probably not be developed in America or China, but hopefully here in Germany.
There was repeated talk of "sustainability" in the comments. Yes, there is a lack of sustainability in the spiritual sense. Europe has abolished faith in God and God himself, the mighty religious foundations were once sustainable and almost limitlessly resilient. The once fruitful European vine has become a winegrower and has separated itself hybristically from the vine.
"I am the vine, you are the branches. He who abides in me and in whom I abide bears much fruit, for apart from me you can do nothing.
Whoever does not remain in me is thrown away like the vine and withers. You gather the branches, throw them into the fire and they burn.
If you remain in me and if my words remain in you, then ask for everything you want: You will receive it." John 15:5-7.
It's as simple as that!
Correction:
The once fruitful European vine has become a winegrower and has separated itself hybristically from the vine.
So I'm definitely not sad to see the EU of today fade into history.
I don't need such an EU in any case, and the requiem sounds horrible.
Geopolitics without a viability check
It is fascinating to observe how naturally people talk about geopolitics today - without first checking whether they can even afford it.
Europe discusses power, deterrence and alliances as if they were questions of political will. As if all we have to do is finally make up our minds, act more decisively and communicate more clearly. This overlooks the fact that power is not an attitude, but a burden. And every burden requires a capacity test.
This deficit is exemplified in the reactions to Werner J. Patzelt's analysis. Some call for military strength and deterrence against Russia because only power is respected. Others explain Europe's weakness with American influence and strategic disintegration. Both positions differ in the image of the enemy, not in the framework of thought. Both tacitly assume that Europe can play this game.
This is precisely the uncomfortable question that is rarely asked.
Europe has neither significant raw materials of its own nor sovereignty in terms of energy policy. It has little risk capital, but a lot of long-term capital that requires stability. It has outsourced its testing function to the state, thereby politicizing risk, concealing losses and replacing credit checks. What is not tested does not disappear - it becomes invisible. And the invisible makes it susceptible to blackmail.
Geopolitical ambitions without proven viability are not an expression of strength, but of self-deception. Deterrence can be claimed, but not conjured up. It arises where systems function even under stress: energetically, financially, infrastructurally. Where they do not, sovereignty turns into dependency - regardless of which side you take morally.
The belief that structural weaknesses can be compensated for through digitalization and complexity is also striking. Efficiency is seen as resilience, automation as security. However, the opposite is always the case in an emergency: digital systems optimize as long as everything works. If it fails, analog structures carry the load. The mechanical lever that interrupts the energy supply needs no discourse and no electricity. It works. That is why it will not disappear.
Europe is facing less of a geopolitical decision than an architectural one. It is not the question of who we position ourselves against that is decisive, but what we can sustain in the long term. Anyone who designs strategies without knowing their statics is playing with borrowed weight.
Perhaps it's time to pull the lever - not as a retreat from the world, but as a change of perspective. First understand, then act. First check what works before deciding what you want. Anything else is not geopolitics, but a costly misunderstanding.
Geopolitics without capital is rhetoric
Comments on Werner J. Patzelt's analysis of the European situation
Werner J. Patzelt describes precisely the situation in which Europe has arrived. Or more precisely: where it no longer stands. The transatlantic self-evidence has disappeared. The USA no longer acts as a power that creates order, but as an actor with vested interests. Rules apply as long as they are useful. Alliances are means, not obligations.
This is not a blip in history, but a structural change. Anyone who still reads it as an episode is confusing political hope with analysis. In this respect, Patzelt's text is sober - and pleasantly free of illusions.
And yet he stops at a point where the real question begins.
Systems do not fail because of targets, but because of load assumptions
Geopolitics is not an act of will.
It is a sustainability problem.
Military capabilities, energy infrastructure, industrial resilience, securing raw materials, technological autonomy - all of this exists not because it is politically desired, but because it is financially supported. Over a long period of time. Under changing conditions. Even when it becomes uncomfortable.
Without capital, there is no staying power.
No strategy without staying power.
And without a strategy, geopolitics remains a narrative.
One may consider this narrative necessary.
They can even be considered correct.
But it should not be confused with stability.
Energy is not a variable, but a basic condition
Energy is not just one factor among many.
Energy is the static base load of geopolitical power.
Those who control them can act.
Those who import them must react.
Imported into Europe. For decades. From changing directions, under changing conditions, with growing political contingency. This is not a moral failure or a political error of judgment. It is a structural fact.
And structures cannot be argued away.
You can ignore them.
You can exaggerate them rhetorically.
But this does not make them disappear.
A game with clear boundaries
The current world order is not an open playing field. It is a power game with clear rules of engagement. Such games are not infinitely scalable. They have two dominant players. Not five. Not seven.
The third player is not a player.
It becomes part of the playing field.
It becomes a market, a space, a transit zone, a security mass.
Or, to put it more soberly: material.
Europe moves precisely in this intermediate space. Too big to be ignored. Too dependent to set its own course. This is not a political judgment, but a description of the system.
Those who have no energy sovereignty and no autonomy of escalation cannot shape geopolitics. They can comment on it, moderate it or endure it.
The silent prerequisite with Patzelt
Patzelt thinks geopolitics from the logic of spaces, powers and interests. This is consistent - but incomplete. This logic presupposes that a system can bear the burdens that arise from strategic decisions.
This is exactly where Europe's problem begins.
Europe has neither dominant resources nor a political architecture that could secure quick, irreversible power decisions in the long term. What Europe does have is something different - and historically no less effective: law, institutional reliability, predictability.
Trust.
And trust is not a value.
It is a system performance.
Capital does not follow goals, but conditions
A central mistake in many geopolitical debates is to treat capital as a tool. As something that can be mobilized when a political emergency arises.
Capital works differently.
Capital is not a lever.
Capital is an actor.
It does not react to intentions, but to framework conditions. Not to narratives, but to structures. Legal certainty. Protection of property. Binding rules. Predictability.
Capital does not ask whether a geopolitical strategy is understandable.
It asks whether it changes the system in which property was previously secure.
The price is not paid politically
The more Europe tries to act geopolitically, the more the structures that have made it attractive come under pressure. Property becomes more political. Law becomes more situational. Procedures become event-driven.
This does not lead to panic.
Not capital flight.
Not to breakdowns.
It leads to something slower - and more permanent: a loss of confidence.
Running times are shortened.
Risks are priced higher.
Capital becomes more cautious.
Europe is not losing substance abruptly.
It gradually loses its naturalness.
And systems that lose their naturalness usually only realize this when it is missing.
The temptation to do it anyway
A geopolitical balance, no matter in which direction, may be strategically tempting. It is only viable for capital if it does not affect the unavailability of rights and property.
This is precisely where the tension lies:
Geopolitics requires flexibility.
Trust requires invariance.
Both are possible at the same time - but not indefinitely.
Europe can pay this price.
But it should know him.
Europe's real strength has never been power
Europe was never strong because it dominated the power game. It was strong because it withdrew from it. Not out of naivety, but out of insight.
It was not an empire. Not a raw materials giant. Not a coercive military power. It was a space in which order prevailed when power decided elsewhere. A space in which capital remained because it did not become part of the political dramaturgy.
That was not moral superiority.
That was functional wisdom.
The actual decision
Europe is not faced with the question of how it can play along geopolitically.
It is faced with the question of whether it should play a game whose burdens it cannot structurally bear.
Because:
Strategies do not fail due to a lack of will.
They fail because of false assumptions about load-bearing capacity.
Europe does not have to become a player.
But it should avoid becoming a figure itself.
Conclusion
Geopolitics can be explained.
Systems can be loaded.
Without capital, power remains empty.
Without trust, capital remains mobile.
And if you overstretch both at the same time,
confuses action with durability.
The emphasis on capital in connection with power would be refuted by any serious diplomat without further ado. Even conclusively.
A reliable reconciliation of interests with Russia, which regards not only the USA but also Europe as an adversary, will only have a basis if Russia's imperial ambitions are stopped in the long term.
This requires that their hegemonic plans in Ukraine clearly fail, that the Russian military is removed from Ukraine as far as possible and that Russia perceives defeat.
If Europe cannot establish a position of power and deterrence, Russia will never accept it as a partner. Then Eurupa will remain a vassal. Today as a vassal of the USA, tomorrow, according to Russian Wilken, as one of Russia.
I think you're confusing something - that's all I can say.
Sorry, you don't really believe that Russia will experience a defeat in Ukraine! Where does Russia's imperial ambition appear? Please provide examples. Or did you get the country wrong and meant the USA? First of all, find out why the fighting broke out in Ukraine and then reconsider your statement.
Actually, especially if you look at the actions and not the words, it's quite obvious. Nevertheless, thank you for your crystal-clear and well-founded commentary on current developments. The USA will not rest until the EU in its current form has disappeared. The initiative of the Visegrad states, which began quite soon after Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined the EU, has now been running for three decades. An important American project to disrupt the unity of Europeans. The current leadership of the EU seems to see itself as the governor of the old USA before Trump, which could also be an indication of a long-standing unspoken conflict over the interests of continental Europe and those of the USA.